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Consumers have access to an ever-increasing inventory of
video content choices as a result of technological innovations,
more readily available broadband, new business plans,
inexpensive high capacity storage and the Internet’s ability to
serve as a single medium for a variety of previously standalone
services delivered via different channels. They increasingly have
little tolerance for “appointment television” that limits access to a
particular time, channel and device. Access to video content is
becoming a matter of using one of several software-configured
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interfaces capable of delivering live and recorded content anytime,
anywhere, to any device and via many different transmission and
presentation formats.
Technological and marketplace convergences eliminate the
viability of judicial and regulatory models that apply varying
degrees of First Amendment protection as a function of the medium
delivering the content. With the Internet serving as a single
conduit for a variety of information, communications and
entertainment, ventures can offer a bundle of services that span
two or more regulatory classifications, for example, the ability of
wireless handsets to make telephone calls, to receive video
programming and to access the Internet.
This Article will examine the ongoing migration from channels
to software-configured platforms for accessing video content with
an eye toward assessing the impact on consumers and the First
Amendment. The Article identifies the need for significant
amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to provide a lighthanded and limited, but explicit statutory basis for the Federal
Communications Commission to resolve predictable disputes
between stakeholders and to remedy anticompetitive practices.
INTRODUCTION
The ways to distribute video content to consumers have begun
to diversify, as the Internet becomes an increasingly attractive
option for delivering programming, and provides an alternative to
broadcast, satellite and cable networks. Viewers no longer need to
tolerate “appointment television,” 1 with access to content at a
prescribed time, available on a single channel and delivered to a
single receiving device using only one acceptable transmission
format. Access primarily will become a matter of using one of
several software-configured interfaces capable of decoding live
1

See John Clancy, Why the Future of TV Is All About Personalization, MASHABLE
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/08/25/tv-mobile-personalization (“Consumers
are changing their viewing habits in favor of ‘TV Everywhere.’ They no longer make
‘appointments’ to sit down and view content, and are no longer limited by TV
programming schedules. They want content whenever and wherever they are.”).
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and recorded content anytime, anywhere, to any device, and
through many different transmission and presentation formats. 2
Diversifying business models for delivering video content
assumes that consumers can and will use multiple platforms to
augment or replace traditional media. 3 Such diversification also
challenges existing legal and regulatory models that support
different degrees of government oversight and content regulation
based on assumptions about a specific medium. For radio and
television broadcasters, the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) has imposed significant regulatory burdens based on
assumptions that spectrum scarcity and the pervasiveness of the
medium warrant mandatory and probably unprofitable public
service obligations. 4 Even prior to receiving explicit statutory
authority, the FCC regulated cable television operators, 5 including
2

In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8613 (2012) (“Online
video, like the Internet itself, has migrated beyond the computer to a wide variety of
devices since the last report. Consumers now can access [online video distributors’
(“OVD”)] service via computers, smartphones, tablets, gaming consoles, smart television
sets, Blu-ray players, and a host of consumer electronics products.”).
3
Id. at 8702. (“To respond to viewers’ desire to view video programming in more
places at more times, broadcast station owners [and other content distributors] have
developed online and mobile media platforms, using their websites as extensions of their
local brands . . . .”)
4
See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–90 (1969) (“Although
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them.” (citation omitted)).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (FCC can use its
ancillary jurisdiction provided by Title I of the Communications Act to regulate a new
technology that has the potential to harm broadcasting, a regulated medium); see also
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 691–95 (1979); United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649, 650–73 (1972); Kevin
Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572 (2010) (“The FCC needed a hook
to assert jurisdiction over cable. To reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the
Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory grant of authority under
section 152(a) of the [Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate ‘all
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.’ Second, the FCC invoked
section 303(r) of the Act, which allows the Commission to issue ‘such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,’ as
‘public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.’ The FCC also referenced section
154(i), which provides that ‘[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such
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the requirement that they deliver local broadcast signals but limit
the number of “imported stations” outside the local market. The
FCC constrained cable operators’ programming freedom based on
the assumption that without program carriage limitations, cable
television viewing would fragment audiences and reduce
broadcasters’ ability to continue providing advertiser-supported
service requiring no additional upfront payment from consumers. 6
The FCC can lawfully constrain and subordinate the First
Amendment speaker rights of broadcasters and cable television
operators based on court-approved balancing of the public and
government interests on one hand, and that of media and conduit
providers on the other hand. 7 Generally, appellate courts have
rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications
Act], as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.’” (citations omitted)).
6
See, e.g.,Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994) (affirming FCC
rules requiring cable operators to carry significantly viewed broadcast station signals)
(“By preventing cable operators from refusing carriage to broadcast television stations,
the must-carry rules ensure that broadcast television stations will retain a large enough
potential audience to earn necessary advertising revenue—or, in the case of
noncommercial broadcasters, sufficient viewer contributions—to maintain their
continued operation. In so doing, the provisions are designed to guarantee the survival of
a medium that has become a vital part of the Nation’s communication system, and to
ensure that every individual with a television set can obtain access to free television
programming.” (citations omitted)).
7
Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, WIS. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2012)
(“Courts routinely reject constitutional objections to government laws providing access to
additional spaces beyond traditional public forums—both to physical and virtual spaces,
on both public and private property. These spaces include shopping malls, phone
networks, cable networks, and wireless networks, among others. Despite the standard
model’s guiding principle that government not interfere with speakers’ decisions and
respect their negative liberty, judicial doctrines have consistently permitted government
interference to ensure affirmative access even to many spaces owned by private parties.
The standard model must recognize doctrinal “exceptions” for regulating access—to
phone systems, to broadcast systems, to cable systems, and to shopping malls—and
different, sui generis exceptions applicable to each space.”). See generally, Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What “The Freedom
of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1686–91 (2011) (examining whether and
how conduits of speech trigger First Amendment implications when analyzing
government activity); Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First
Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of
Participation-Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185 (2007) (examining
networks’ colliding First Amendment interests and judicial avoidance of a resolution of
such issues); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64
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deferred to the FCC’s expert judgment that constraints on speech
are reasonable and not targeted at specific types of content. 8 A
substantial body of law now supports mutually exclusive and
media-specific models that qualify the First Amendment speaker
rights of broadcasters, 9 and even cable television operators whose
closed-circuit networks do not use spectrum. 10 Additionally the
jurisprudence applicable to telephone companies assumes that such
ventures operate solely as neutral conduits for delivering the
content of others. 11 This common carrier model 12 draws a parallel
between the neutral conduit function of telephone companies with

N.Y.U. L. REV. 990 (1989) (evaluating broadcasters’ freedom of speech and press and
critique of judicial decisions that restrict broadcasters’ First Amendment rights).
8
See, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (affirming FCC
regulation of what broadcast television signals a cable television operator can import);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming FCC rules
requiring most cable television operators to provide local programming origination and
distribution opportunities).
9
See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (affirming FCC requirement that
broadcast stations provide free air time for coverage of campaigns including presidential
debates); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (affirming FCC
regulation and limits on combined ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers in the
same local market); Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 375 (affirming compulsory right of
reply to personal attack); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
(affirming FCC regulation of the commercial relationship between broadcast networks
and local station affiliates).
10
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (affirming FCC
mandated carriage of significantly viewed broadcast television stations by cable
television ventures based on an intermediate scrutiny assessment of regulations deemed
not directly impacting broadcasters’ speaker rights); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util.
Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the essential element of common
carriage is the carrier’s undertaking to carry for all people indifferently).
11
Computer and Comm. Indus. Assoc. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(common carriers provide a service whereby customers may transmit intelligence of their
own design and choosing).
12
47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2006) (Telecommunications carriers have “[t]he duty to
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of
the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this title. An
incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a
manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such
telecommunications service.”).
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other traditional public utilities providing electric, water, gas,
sewage and other essential services.
Technological and marketplace convergences 13 in the
communications industry have rendered, or soon will render,
obsolete assumptions about how specific media operate and the
rationales for applying discrete and mutually exclusive regulatory
models. Content creators and packagers will no longer rely on
channel-based distribution technologies to deliver content. 14
Instead consumers increasingly expect to have access at their
convenience and on more flexible terms and conditions:
Today, the major [multichannel video programming
distributors (“MVPDs”)] offer hundreds of linear
television channels, which are streams of
programming that offer video programs on a
specific channel at a specific time of day. Many
MVPDs also offer thousands of non-linear videoon-demand (“VOD”) programs, including pay-perview (“PPV”) programs, which allow consumers to
select and watch video programs whenever they
request them. 15
The terms Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) 16 and Overthe-Top Television
13

Technological convergence refers to innovations that make it possible for a single
medium to deliver several different types of content previously handled by separate
networks. For example, the Internet’s transmission of digital bitstreams makes it possible
to handle voice, data, text and video content via a single network. Marketplace
convergence refers to the ability of a single venture to offer a bundle of services
previously offered by other companies.
14
See Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 9488, 9489
(2012) (memorandum opinion and order), aff’d Bloomberg L.P. v. Comcast Cable
Commc’ns, 59 Communications Reg. (P&F) 118 (F.C.C. Sept. 26, 2013) (memorandum
opinion and order) (affirming Media Bureau interpretation of merger conditions requiring
Comcast to position together in a sequence of channels all outlets of similar content, for
example, news, when the company previously had opted to create such a “neighborhood”
of some channels).
15
In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8617 (2012).
16
IPTV offers consumers with broadband connections options to download video files
or view video content on an immediate “real time” basis. In re Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25
F.C.C.R. 3879, 3879 (2010) (emergency petition for temporary standstill). Some of the
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(“OTT”) 17 refer to the ability of content creators and new or
existing content distributors to provide consumers with access via
broadband links in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional media.
Currently content creators and distributors are experimenting with
new options, having perhaps reluctantly acknowledged that the
status quo cannot persist in light of proliferating consumer selfhelp opportunities, many of which violate copyright laws and make
it possible for consumers to access premium content for free. 18
The Internet offers many legitimate, questionable and
absolutely illegal opportunities to access both amateur and
professional video content via the transmission of files for
subsequent replay, through real time streaming of files and even
the transmission of “live” programming, including pay-television
sporting events. Consumers with access to high-speed broadband
networks can launch applications and visit websites providing
convenient techniques for acquiring movies and other premium
content. 19
Creators of content distributed via the Internet rightly expect to
qualify for First Amendment protection, because the medium of
distribution used should not impact their right to offer content in a
available content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering
disputes over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and
prevent an IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. Id. at 3879–80
(“Sky Angel has been providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for
approximately two and a half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet,
Discovery Kids Channel, Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that
these channels are a significant part of its service offering.”). For background on IPTV,
see In-Sung Yoo, The Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the
Federal Communications Commission Should Abstain From Cable Service Regulation
and Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199, 202–205 (2009).
17
See In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 F.C.C.R.
17905, n.48 (2010) (report and order) (“Over-the-top VoIP [and other] services require
the end user to obtain broadband transmission from a third-party provider, and providers
of over-the-top . . . [services] can vary in terms of the extent to which they rely on their
own facilities.”).
18
See The TWC TV App Will Allow You to Watch On Demand and Live Programming
Outside Your Home, TW CABLE UNTANGLED, http://www.twcableuntangled.com/
2013/04/the-twc-tv-app-will-allow-you-to-watch-on-demand-and-live-programmingoutside-your-home/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
19
See, e.g., NETFLIX, http://www.neflix.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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robustly competitive marketplace of ideas. However, distributors
of such content using an Internet conduit do not have the same
certainty of First Amendment protection or insulation from FCC
regulatory oversight. On one hand, IPTV operators can make a
persuasive argument that they operate as functional equivalents to
cable television operators and other packagers of content.
Similarly, the FCC has determined that any provider of Internet
access provides an information service thereby qualifying for a
largely unregulated status. 20 If the FCC has largely deregulated all
broadband conduit providers, then it would stand to reason that
creators and packagers of content riding on top of a broadband link
similarly operate as information service providers.
On the other hand, the FCC has come to realize that some
providers of broadband Internet access have both the ability and
incentive to engage in anticompetitive conduct that could thwart an
open and robustly competitive marketplace for new Internetmediated competitive alternatives to existing services. The FCC
secured a voluntary forfeiture of $15,000 and an agreement by a
small, rural telephone company not to block its broadband
subscribers from accessing competitive Voice over the Internet
Protocol (“VoIP”) 21 telephone service. 22 Determining that
20

See Time Warner Telecom., Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); In re
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless
Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5909–14 (2007) (declaratory ruling); In re United Power
Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of
Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, 21
F.C.C.R. 13281, 13285–90 (2006) (memorandum opinion and order); In re Appropriate
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R.
14853, 14863 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (reclassifying
as an information service telephone company provided Internet access via Digital
Subscriber Lines); In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4821 (2002) (Cable Declaratory Ruling),
aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–78
(2005) (affirming FCC determination that cable modem Internet access constitutes a
largely unregulated information service).
21
VoIP is the real-time carriage and delivery of data packets that correspond to voice.
VoIP services range in quality, reliability, and price and can link both computers and
ordinary telephone handsets. For technical background on how VoIP works, see Susan
Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical Challenges Associated with the
Evolution to VoIP, FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.fcc.gov/events/tutorial-technicalchallenges-associated-evolution-voip.
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Comcast, a major media venture, might seek to favor its own video
content, or that of affiliates, the FCC sanctioned the company
when it deliberately prevented certain broadband subscribers from
downloading and sharing video files. 23 On appeal Comcast
convinced a reviewing court that the FCC lacked direct statutory
authority to regulate Comcast’s information services. 24 Despite
the potential for consumer harm, the court held that the FCC could
not lawfully stretch its indirect authority to fashion a remedy. 25
A contentious debate has run for many years on the need for
government oversight of Internet access and the imposition of
nondiscrimination, network neutrality 26 obligations on Internet
Service Providers (“ISPs”). 27 Such concerns for consumer
22

In re Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4297 (2005). See
generally Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone:
The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal
Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293, 332–37 (2008) (characterization of
VoIP).
23
In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028 (2008)
(memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
24
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC lacked
direct statutory authority to sanction an ISP for discriminatory practices).
25
Id. at 644 (“The Commission has failed to make that showing. It relies principally on
several Congressional statements of policy, but under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
case law, statements of policy, by themselves, do not create ‘statutorily mandated
responsibilities.’”); see also Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“The Commission may exercise this ‘ancillary’ authority only if it demonstrates
that its action-here barring Comcast from interfering with its customers’ use of peer-topeer networking applications-is “reasonably ancillary to the . . . effective performance of
its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”).
26
Network neutrality refers to government mandated nondiscrimination, transparency
and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field among
content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have
unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns, such as ISP network management
and national security. See Rob Frieden, A Primer on Network Neutrality, 43
INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUR. ECON. POL’Y, 4, 5 (2008).
27
See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Bill D. Herman,
Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L.J.
103 (2006); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001);
Lawrence Lessig, In Support of Network Neutrality, 3 ISJLP 185 (2007); Sascha D.
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protection and a level competitive playing field have a direct
impact on the scope and nature of First Amendment protection
available not only for ISPs, but possibly also for ventures using an
ISP conduit to deliver video content. ISPs may overstate the scope
of their content creation, management and packaging function,
particularly in light of their primary function as neutral conduits
and their incentive to operate mostly as a neutral party. By
claiming only to operate as neutral conduits, ISPs secure a near
complete exemption from liability for the criminal and tortious
conduct of subscribers, for example, the delivery of defamatory
statements, 28 as well as their copyright infringement, for example,
the delivery of pirated video content. 29 Nevertheless the nature
and scope of First Amendment protection and insulation from
regulatory oversight remains uncertain.
This Article will examine the ongoing migration from channels
to software-configured platforms for accessing video content with
Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: Ten Steps Toward an Open
Internet, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2008, at 1; Jennifer L. Newman, Keeping the Internet
Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role in Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 153 (2008); Amit M. Schejter, “Justice, and Only Justice,
You Shall Pursue”: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory
of Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137 (2007); Tim Wu, Network
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 141 (2003).
28
See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2010) (“No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.”). Courts have construed
the immunity provisions in section 230 broadly in all cases arising from the publication
of user-generated content. See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d
Cir. 2003) (finding statutory immunity from tort claims within provisions of § 230);
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding
after examination of prior judicial decisions that statutory immunity was granted from
torts under § 230); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–31, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003)
(determining that § 230 confers immunity on providers and users of interactive computer
services); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–86 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding defendant immune to suit under § 230 for merely relaying information
of a third party); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–32 (4th Cir. 1997)
(distributor liability foreclosed under § 230).
29
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (2010) exempts ISPs
from liability for the infringement of a subscriber if the ISPs, upon notice, take down the
content in a timely manner; see, e.g., IO Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.
Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (supporting safe harbor provision for service providers
under § 512(c)).
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an eye toward identifying near-term and longer-term impact on the
commercial video marketplace and the First Amendmentsupported marketplace of ideas. This Article identifies the need
for significant amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to
provide a light-handed and limited, but explicit statutory basis for
the FCC to resolve predictable disputes between stakeholders and
to remedy anticompetitive practices. Because the currently
fractious and politicized Congress is not likely to act, this Article
provides suggestions on what the FCC can lawfully do now to
provide greater regulatory clarity and specific, limited safeguards.
I. BROADBAND TELEVISION
OTT refers to the use of broadband transmission networks to
deliver video bitstreams “on top of” other services such as Internet
access and email. 30 Consumers must subscribe to fast, high
30

See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and
Services, 19 FCC Rcd. 15676, 15713 n.181 (2004) (“In the Open System Interconnection
(‘OSI’) model, layered network architecture for packet networks typically consists of seven
layers: physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation and application. The
model calls for the independent operation of the layers, and supports the interaction of
various applications and equipment that is designed to address separately each layer in a
product offering. In the Transport Control Protocol (‘TCP’)-IP model, only four levels are
used; link (combines OSI physical and data link levels), network, transport and application
(combines OSI session, presentation and application levels). The functions supported at
each layer are as follows: physical–represents electrical signaling, modulation, etc.; data
link–moves packets (also called ‘datagrams’) between hosts based on a protocol such as
Ethernet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode, frame relay; network–defines how data is routed
between hosts over one or several networks, often based on IP; transport–establishes the
connection between two hosts, creating a ‘virtual’ network, often based on TCP or
Universal Datagram Protocol; session–controls the setup and termination of
communications sessions; presentation–defines the format of the data exchanged (e.g., text,
graphic); application–defines how applications communicate with each other over the
network (e.g., e-mail) using various protocols.”). See generally Joshua L. Mindel &
Douglas C. Sicker, Leveraging the EU Regulatory Framework to Improve a Layered Policy
Model for US Telecommunications Markets, 30 TELECOMM. POL’Y 136, 137 (2006); David
P. Reed, Critiquing the Layered Regulatory Model, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
281 (2006) (detailing and critiquing the layered model, highlighting potential inherent
economic consequences); Douglas C. Sicker & Lisa Blumensaadt, Misunderstanding the
Layered Model(s), 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 299 (2006) (describing the layered
model and its subsequent misinterpretation while emphasizing its continued utility);
Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle; Internet Architecture and the

2013]

THE IMPACT OF NEXT GENERATION TELEVISION

71

capacity broadband services, because video service requires
networks that can transmit content on an instantaneous “real time”
basis. Even low quality video files, which are highly compressed
and have comparatively lower resolution, require broadband
networks that can deliver traffic at about one megabit per second
or higher. 31
OTT can enhance the value proposition offered by ISPs as
subscribers increase their video content downloading and
uploading activity thanks to the synergistic and serendipitous
opportunities available from broadband networking. Internet
protocols support the loading, switching and routing of different
kinds of traffic through the networks that interconnect to form the
Internet cloud. 32 This means that Internet routers can handle video
traffic in much the same way as they manage other less intensive
bandwidth applications. So long as the networks providing
bitstream transmission can handle higher capacity streams and
files, they can provide a medium for the delivery of video. The
term IPTV refers to the ability of the Internet, and specifically its
Internet Protocol addressing scheme and its Transmission Control
Protocol bitstream management formats, to provide broadband
users with user-friendly ways to access video content. 33
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004) (describing and supporting internet regulation via
a layered model); Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward; Formulating a New
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED.
COMM. L.J. 587 (2004) (detailing the current regulatory framework and advocating an
approach that regulates along horizontal network layers).
31
See Broadband Speed Guide, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/broadband-speed-guide (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
32
The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up
the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the
content available via these networks. See William Jeremy Robison, Free at What Cost?:
Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195,
1199 (2010) (“The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the
personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the
ability to run applications and store data on a service provider’s computers over the
Internet, rather than on a person’s desktop computer.”).
33
See Konrad L. Trope, Voice Over Internet Protocol: The Revolution in America’s
Telecommunications Infrastructure, 22 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW 1, 3 (2005) (“The
Internet is a vast network of individual computers and computer networks that
communicate with each other using the same communications language, Transmission
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). The Internet consists of approximately more
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Many broadband subscribers of both wired and wireless
services have discovered the benefit of using their subscriptions to
access video. In doing so, these subscribers may substantially
increase the total volume of content they download. Broadband
carriers, particularly wireless operators, have become concerned
that such downloading will trigger network congestion and exhaust
existing capacity, requiring an ever growing investment in
broadband plant. 34 By offering subscribers unmetered, “all you
can eat” (“AYCE”) service, broadband carriers have encouraged
experimentation and access without regard to the operational and
cost burdens incurred by ISPs. Now many broadband carriers have
abandoned AYCE pricing and offer metered service at different
monthly rates based on the amount of permissible content
downloading. 35 In lieu of tiered service, many ISPs invoke traffic

than 100 million computers around the world using TCP/IP protocols. Along with the
development of TCP/IP, the open network architecture of the Internet has the following
characteristics or parameters: 1. Each distinct network stands on its own with its own
specific environment and user requirements, notwithstanding the use of TCP/IP to
connect to other parts of the Internet. Communications are not directed in a unilateral
fashion. Rather, communications are routed throughout the Internet on a best efforts basis
in which some packets of information may go through one series of computer networks
and other packets of information go through a different permutation or combination of
computer networks, with all of these information packets eventually arriving at their
intended destination. 2. Black boxes, for lack of a better term, connect the various
networks; these boxes are called “gateways” and “routers.” The gateways and routers do
not retain information but merely provide access and flow for the packets being
transmitted. 3. There is no global control of the Internet.”).
34
See Stacey Higginbotham, Spectrum Shortage Will Strike in 2013, GIGAOM (Feb.
17, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2010/02/17/analyst-spectrum-shortage-willstrike-in-2013 (“The demand for mobile broadband will surpass the spectrum available to
meet it in mid-2013, according to Peter Rysavy, a wireless analyst. In a report on the
looming spectrum crisis that was sponsored by Research in Motion for the Mobile World
Congress in Barcelona, Rysavy explains how the demand for bandwidth-consuming
services used by more and more people will lead to a crappy user experience, or heavyhanded pricing . . . and limitations on mobile application from carriers absent new
spectrum allocations.”).
35
See Brian Stelter, Sweeping Effects as Broadband Moves to Meters, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/media/internet-providerstesting-metered-plans-for-broadband.html (“The broadband era began with the
expectation that Internet connections were like buffets—all you can eat, 24 hours a day.
But users are now being prodded to think about how much they’re consuming . . . .
Usage-based billing is seen by some as a fairer alternative to broadband caps, a term most
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management necessity as justification for deliberately slowing
down (“throttling”) the delivery of traffic to subscribers exceeding
a quota of permissible downloading volume. 36
Prior to the elimination of AYCE service, ISPs branded the
highest volume subscribers “bandwidth hogs” in light of their
potential to cause network congestion. ISPs consider these heavy
users of broadband networks as a problem instead of an
opportunity. While heavy demand for data service contributes to
short term congestion and the need to increase transmission
capacity, subscribers’ expanded demand for broadband provides
ISPs with the enviable long term opportunity to serve a growing
market rather than one that has become static or declining.
OTT distribution includes two primary ways to deliver content:
(1) the immediate, “real time” streaming of programs
simultaneously available via other traditional media, such as
satellite, cable and broadcast television; and (2) the streaming or
downloading of files containing video content, some of which was
initially available only from incumbent media outlets. Different
commercial models have evolved to simulcast live content,
download content and stream content without allowing consumers
to store the file. Incumbents recognize the need to offer more
convenient access, but they do not want to make it possible for
nonsubscribers to access the content, or for subscribers to record
and redistribute it. 37
closely associated with Comcast, which had been enforcing a limit of 250 gigabytes per
Internet customer per month.”).
36
See Tim Greene, Verizon Wireless Puts Bandwidth Hogs On A Data Diet, NETWORK
WORLD (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/020311-verizonwireless-bandwidth-hogs.html (“Verizon will throttle back bandwidth available to the
biggest data hogs on its wireless network in what it calls an effort to keep up service
quality for everybody else.”).
37
See Brian Stelter, Campaign Trains Viewers for ‘TV Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/business/media/campaign-trains-viewersfor-tv-everywhere.html?_r=2&smid=tw-NYTimesAd&seid=auto. For example, some
major cable television operators have begun to offer subscribers the opportunity to access
premium content via computers, tablets and smartphones away from the home television
set. Id. This “television everywhere” concept seeks to maintain the cable television
subscription as prerequisite for access via other video content platforms. Id. (“[Putting]
in place TV Everywhere, a long-promised system for online television, calls for new
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II. REGULATORY STATUS AND FIRST AMENDMENT SPEAKER
RIGHTS OF IPTV SERVICE PROVIDERS
When IPTV service providers limit their activity to creating
content, they qualify as uncontested First Amendment-protected
speakers. 38 The controversy over First Amendment protection
occurs when a video content provider also manages the delivery
process using owned or acquired broadband capacity. When
content and conduit combine, questions arise as to whether and
how First Amendment protections apply to the blended service, or
if it remains limited to the content.
First Amendment jurisprudence clearly supports the extension
of some, although not all, First Amendment protection to ventures
that do not create content, but instead package and distribute it.
For example, operators of book stores qualify for First Amendment
protection against government censorship and confiscation of
content, even though the owner did not write the books and may
not even know the nature of the content contained in any specific
publication on the shelf. 39 Similarly, cable and satellite television
contracts between channels and distributors and for new technology to check that viewers
have paid their cable bills. And it takes something else: training. Viewers, after all, are
not accustomed to being able to go online and see a library’s worth of television on
demand.”).
38
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court
held that restrictions on Internet-mediated content should trigger strict scrutiny because
of the potential for harm to First Amendment protected speech:
We are persuaded that the CDA [a law imposing sanctions for
making content available via the Internet that can harm children]
lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute
regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to
potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was
enacted to serve.
Id. at 874.
39
See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–55 (1959) (declaring unconstitutional a
city ordinance making it illegal for bookstore operators to have obscene books, even
unknowingly); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) (citing Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)) (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom
of the press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication . . . .”).
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operators acquire First Amendment protections in their capacity as
packagers and distributors of content created by affiliates and even
unaffiliated ventures. 40
However First Amendment rights can be qualified and
conditioned as applied to ventures that do not create content, but
instead operate in one of the distribution channels that eventually
reach consumers. Courts have affirmed the FCC’s lawful authority
to impose restrictions and limitations on cable 41 and satellite
operators’ 42 speech. Cable operators must offer to subscribers all
significantly viewed local television stations whose management
elects to forego copyright compensation in exchange for
mandatory carriage. 43 Additionally the FCC can impose caps on
the national market penetration achieved by a single operator 44
and establish well-reasoned safeguards against domination of the
market for the creation of video content. 45 Satellite operators have
to allocate a portion of their channel capacity for the carriage of

40

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806–07 (2000)
(invalidating a federal statute that required cable companies to either scramble or limit
non-obscene pornography channels to certain hours). In United States v. Playboy Entm’t
Grp., Inc., the Court held that Congress needed to generate the least restrictive option
among equally effective alternatives, such as having parent request scrambling or use
filtering technology. Id. at 814–15. Because content-based restrictions to protect minors
from harmful materials must pass a rigorous “strict scrutiny” standard of judicial review,
the Court opted not to burden cable television operators with mandatory filtering duties.
Id. at 825–27.
41
See cases cited supra note 5.
42
See, e.g., Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 973–77 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to affirm congressionally mandated channel set aside by
Direct Broadcast Satellite for noncommercial educational and informational
programming).
43
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994).
44
See Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1993), rev’d
in part sub nom. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1316–20
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding cap on national market penetration passes intermediate
scrutiny). But see, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding FCC
failed to provide sufficient justification for a 30% national market penetration cap).
45
See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming
some FCC restrictions on market penetration and reversing others).
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children’s programming 46 and provide advertising capacity to
candidates for elected office. 47
Some IPTV ventures offer content only while others combine
content and conduit in much the same manner as cable television
operators. Content-only IPTV ventures require users to secure a
broadband pathway to the content using the broadband facilities of
one or more ISPs. The combination of content and conduit occurs
seamlessly, but different companies participate. For example, a
subscriber to the Netflix movie streaming service secures two
necessary subscriptions—one with Netflix for access to content
and one with a retail ISP that provides access to and from the
Internet cloud. 48 Upstream from the retail ISP, additional ventures
provide the link to Netflix. 49 Some of these carriers operate as
Content Distribution Networks (“CDNs”) that have agreed to
provide downstream delivery of content from Netflix directly to
the retail ISP that delivers the streaming content to a subscriber. In
some instances Netflix’s CDN interconnects with one or more ISPs
before the traffic reaches the retail ISP making the final link to a
viewer.
Some ISPs have claimed First Amendment speaker status in
FCC proceedings and in litigation. 50 These claims provide a basis
46
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(f)(1) (2013) (“DBS providers shall reserve four percent of
their channel capacity exclusively for use by qualified programmers for noncommercial
programming of an educational or informational nature.”).
47
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(b) (mandating political broadcasting requirements).
48
See How Does Netflix Work?, Watching Netflix, NETFLIX, https://support.netflix.
com/en/node/412.
49
See Kevin Fitchard, Forget the CDN players, Netflix is caching its own video,
GIGAOM (June 4, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://gigaom.com/2012/06/04/forget-the-cdn-playersnetflix-is-caching-its-own-video/; Todd Spangler, Netflix Uncouples ‘Super HD’ from
Content-Delivery Network Program, VARIETY MAGAZINE, (Sep. 26, 2013, 2:58 PM).
http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/netflix-stops-trying-to-use-super-hd-to-pushcontent-delivery-network-program-1200671376/.
50
See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905,
17981–83 (2010) (report and order); see also Paul Barbagallo, Verizon First Amendment
Challenge Of Net Neutrality Tests Century of Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 24,
2013), http://www.bna.com/verizon-first-amendment-n17179872014 (discussing
implications pending Verizon case, indicating that “[i]f the court agrees with Verizon, the
FCC rules would be repealed, and every company that provides a pipeline through which
consumers gain access to the internet, including Verizon, would be free to block websites

2013]

THE IMPACT OF NEXT GENERATION TELEVISION

77

for objecting to efforts by the FCC to impose network neutrality
requirements in addition to invoking the Comcast case precedent.
More broadly they support the premise that the FCC should impose
no regulations whatsoever. By subordinating the conduit function
and emphasizing the speaker function, ISPs seek to maintain or
broaden their unregulated status as either information service
providers, First Amendment speakers, or both.
This two-track strategy may prevail, despite significant
deficiencies. While an appellate court did reverse the FCC when it
attempted to sanction Comcast, 51 another panel in the very same
court affirmed the Commission’s imposition of interconnection
obligations on wireless carriers providing information services. In
Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 52 the court accepted the FCC’s
rationale that it could regulate aspects of how wireless carriers
provide data service. 53
The FCC ordered all cellular
radiotelephone companies to interconnect their wireless data
networking capabilities, so that users temporarily located outside
their home service territory could continue to access Internet
services. 54 Previously, the FCC had ordered these companies to
provide voice telephone service to such “roaming” users so that
these visitors would continue to make and receive calls. 55 The
FCC could mandate voice roaming interconnection because Title II
of the Communications Act directly applies to these carriers
operating as common carriers and offering Title II regulated

or treat their own web content better than that of rivals.”). See generally Benjamin, supra
note 7 (rejecting the premise that ISP conduit function warrants First Amendment
protection); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010) (arguing that ISP’s
editorial discretion fosters rather than impedes free speech values).
51
See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R 13028, 13028
(2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
52
700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
53
Id. at 537.
54
Id. at 539.
55
See In re Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 482 (1981) (report and order).
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telecommunications services. 56 The duty to interconnect with
other carriers constitutes one of the basic nondiscrimination and
accessibility requirements contained in Title II of the
Communications Act. 57
On the other hand cellphone company provision of wireless
broadband data services does not trigger Title II FCC regulatory
authority because the Commission determined that such an
undertaking constitutes an information service. 58 Notwithstanding
the FCC’s clear inability to impose Title II common carrier
responsibilities, the court accepted the FCC’s assertion that
compulsory roaming service was reasonable and did not constitute
the unlawful imposition of a common carrier responsibility when it
applies to wireless data service.
The court deferred to the FCC’s expertise and ability to
differentiate between common carrier responsibilities and what one
could call quasi-common carrier responsibilities that impose a duty
to deal: “[C]ommon carriage is not all or nothing—there is a gray
area in which although a given regulation might be applied to
common carriers, the obligations imposed are not common
carriage per se.” 59 The court noted that the FCC had not required
the wireless carriers to offer roaming access on a uniform basis.
Instead the FCC required only that the carriers negotiate
“commercially reasonable” agreements that could take into
consideration specific circumstances presented by each roaming
access request, including the possibility of not having to provide
service if technically infeasible. 60

56

See Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 538. The Communications Act of 1934 defines a
common carrier as “any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or
foreign communication by wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of
energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter.”
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (2006)).
57
47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276 (2006).
58
Cellco P’ship, 700 F.3d at 538.
59
Id. at 547.
60
Id. at 537 (“[A]lthough the rule bears some marks of common carriage, we defer to
the Commission’s determination that the rule imposes no common carrier obligations on
mobile-internet providers.”).
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The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals appears comfortable with
the application of different Titles of the Communications Act to a
single carrier when it provides different services resulting in “a
bifurcated regulatory scheme.” 61 The FCC has evidenced less
comfort in subjecting a single venture to varying degrees of
regulatory oversight. 62 The Commission may have concluded that
any and all retail broadband service qualifies as an information
service based on its disinclination to make a nuanced decision
whether and how to impose narrow requirements such as data
roaming. Now having made such a decision and having received
judicial approval, the FCC might have a renewed inclination to
expand selectively its regulatory wingspan.
III. EVOLVING TRENDS IN VIDEO DISTRIBUTION
Consumers now have added flexibility and choices made
possible by the evolution of three content display devices. In
addition to the conventional television set, which delivers one of
many channels in sequence, computer monitors, wireless
smartphones, and tablets offer a second, third, and fourth screen.
These devices can display Internet-based content along with
additional or duplicative content packaged by the carriers
providing broadband access. Consumers appear willing to tolerate
significant difference in the visual and audio quality of service
when viewed on different sized screens. They also appear
“technology agnostic” regarding which medium delivers the
content.
Consumers have become less tolerant of attempts by content
distributors, in particular, to restrict access from alternative, nonincumbent platforms. Many appear to have few qualms about
accessing content that may violate copyright laws. A significant
percentage of early adopters of new video access platforms may
pursue illegal self-help options should content creators and

61

Id. at 538.
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522
(1998) (report to Congress).
62

80

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:60

distributors opt to reduce opportunities to access highly desirable,
“must see” television. 63
In conjunction with expanded display options, three models for
video access have evolved:
(1)Illegal, copyright infringing access to content via efficient
peer-to-peer file transfer, or other direct links, as well as real time
streaming of video content files and live television;
(2) New, lawful access to live television or video files via new
intermediaries such as Amazon, Apple, Hulu, Netflix, Roku and
YouTube; 64 and
(3) Efforts by incumbent broadcasters, broadcast networks,
Direct Broadcast Satellite operators and cable television systems to
offer new “television everywhere” options that provide additional
access options to conventional appointment television and
programmed recording of content.
In the transition to platform-delivered content access
incumbents and market entrants will compete for audiences.
Market entrants will provide new, more flexible options that in
turn will force incumbents to provide greater value and access
options lest they lose market share. Heretofore content creators
have explored new distribution options without abandoning
traditional channels.
Currently successful content creators
appreciate that the status quo has generated substantial returns,
largely because the models lock in and guarantee predictable,
recurring payments from consumers. For example, the cable and
63

See Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers) about Piracy or Copyright
Infringement, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/piracy/faq.cgi (last visited
Nov. 15, 2013) (“Digital technology allows perfect copies and easy distribution of some
works. That makes it easier for people to make and get copies of songs or videogames,
and more difficult for copyright holders (record companies, etc.) to control the works
once they are released to the public. This new technology has changed the way content
distributors relate with their customers, and law and business models are just trying to
catch up.”).
64
AMAZON INSTANT VIDEO, http://www.amazon.com/Instant-Video/b?ie=UTF8&node
=2858778011 (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); HULU, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Nov.
9, 2013); NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); ROKU,
http://www.roku.com/?gclid=CL6P-eKQ2LoCFeHm7AodQhkAfg (last visited Nov. 9,
2013); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
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satellite television model requires monthly subscription payments
from subscribers who receive many channels, not all of which any
single subscriber would want. By aggregating channels and
prohibiting subscribers from choosing which individual channels
they want on an individual, “à la carte” basis, 65 cable television
operators can accrue higher revenues for more costly service tiers
that package both desirable and unwanted channels. Sources of
content appreciate that the aggregate revenues from an entire
population of video subscribers will exceed the higher payments
from a smaller subset of that population who select a specific
channel of content. For example, ESPN likely accrues more
revenue from a smaller per-subscriber payment applicable to every
cable and satellite subscriber than from a higher per-subscriber
payment applicable only to à la carte subscribers who specify the
desire to receive ESPN. Similarly, even lightly viewed networks
can impose small monthly fees for all subscribers purchasing a tier
of programming comprising dozens of channels. 66
Incumbent content creators and distributors appreciate that new
distribution platforms can offer additional revenue generating
opportunities. However, the potential exists for these options not
to accrue added revenues in light of the need to enhance the value
proposition of monthly content subscriptions by offering greater
flexibility for accessing and replaying content. In the worst case
scenario, a significant number of viewers can find ways to access
content—even premium, pay per view offerings—at little or no
cost, because an unauthorized party has pirated the content. With
65

In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8759 (2012) (footnotes
omitted) (“According to Nielsen, Americans watched on average 32 hours and 47
minutes a week of traditional television and two hours and 21 minutes a week of timeshifted television, compared to 27 minutes a week of video on the Internet, and only 7
minutes a week of video on a mobile phone. Screen Digest estimated that all of the à la
carte sales of television shows from Apple, Amazon, and other OVD competitors would
amount to only $407 million in 2010, compared to what PriceWaterhouseCoopers
estimates would be the $143 billion spent on television advertising and subscriptions.”)
66
For example, Viacom typically offers cable television operators a bundle of
networks that combine preferred programming, such as MTV and Nickelodeon, with
obscure and less desired content, such as MTV2 and VH1 Classic. See Viacom Brands,
VIACOM, http://www.viacom.com/brands/pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
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lower cost or free access to desirable content, consumers may
become more inclined to “cut the cord” and abandon subscriptions
with existing intermediaries.
Incumbent distributors such as DBS and cable television
operators risk “disintermediation,” that is, elimination as
middlemen in a chain of distribution if OTT and other access
options offer a better value proposition for access to desired
content. Even if new distribution options impose pay-per-view
charges, or monthly subscription rates, consumers might have
available new, à la carte options that provide access to desired
content with a much lower total out of pocket cost. The loss of
access to even many channels may not matter if consumers had
little interest in much of the content included in a package of
channels. Accordingly incumbent video distribution operators may
have to respond to new access options with efforts to enhance the
value proposition of their monthly and sizeable subscription
charges based on an unmetered AYCE model.
Content creators may financially benefit from new distribution
options and windows of availability, particularly if they achieve
greater control over access and do not have to share as much
revenue with distribution partners. However, the greater risk of
piracy and strained relationships with long standing distribution
partners, such as DBS and cable television, also motivate content
creators to experiment cautiously. 67
IV. ILLEGAL, COPYRIGHT INFRINGING MODELS
The earliest video content access opportunities resulted from an
adaptation of existing peer-to-peer file sharing techniques such as
BitTorrent that started as music sharing sites. Because file sharing
software and the Internet generally make no distinction between
file types, users found it easy to add video files. Similarly, Internet
protocols support the “real time” delivery of video programming as
67

See Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the
Music Industry, 2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001 (2007), available at
http://bciptf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/25-AN-EXPLORATION-OF-RIGHTSMANAGEMENT-TECHNOLOGIES-USED-IN-THE-MUSIC-INDUSTRY.pdf.
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well as the downloading of video content files. 68 A variety of
websites currently offer lawful and legally suspect, “simulcast”
access to live television, including premium channels. 69
Absent a license to redistribute video content and the expected
agreement to compensate the copyright holder, these sites violate
the intellectual property of content creators and distributors.
Ample case law supports the conclusion that web-based providers
of access to content can be held secondarily liable for copyright
infringement even though the software and Internet-routing used
directly links the source of the content to the recipient. 70
Intermediaries that knowingly facilitate or induce copyright
infringement bear the legal responsibility for damages caused by
others. 71 This means that web-based sites that help promote
infringement will be deemed legally responsible for the financial
damages resulting from the distribution of file sharing software

68

See In re Sky Angel U.S., LLC, 25 FCC Rcd. 3879, 3879–80 (2010) (IPTV offers
consumers with broadband connections options to download video files or view
(streaming) video content on an immediate “real time” basis. Some of the available
content duplicates what cable television subscribers receive therein triggering disputes
over whether cable operators can secure exclusive distribution agreements and prevent an
IPTV service provider from distributing the same content. “Sky Angel has been
providing its subscribers with certain Discovery networks for approximately two and a
half years, including the Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids Channel,
Planet Green, and the Military Channel. Sky Angel submits that these channels are a
significant part of its service offering.”). For background on IPTV, see In-Sung Yoo, The
Regulatory Classification of Internet Protocol Television: How the Federal
Communications Commission Should Abstain from Cable Service Regulation and
Promote Broadband Deployment, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 199 (2009).
69
See, e.g.,NO SUBSCRIPTION REQUIRED, http://www.nosubscriptionrequired.net/ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2013); see also, WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d. Cir. 2012)
(affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction based the holding that Internet-based
venture did not qualify as a cable television operator); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. AEREO,
Inc., 874 F.Supp.2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (preliminary injunction denied thereby allowing
a venture to deliver broadcast channels via the Internet), aff’d sub nom,WNET v. Aereo,
Inc. Docket Nos. 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos.,
Inc. v. AEREO, 571 U.S. ___ (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-461).
70
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005) (holding a knowing distributor of copyrighted material liable for resulting third
party acts of infringement).
71
See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04
(2009).
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and from offering a web-based platform for access to sources of
copyright infringing content.
IPTV techniques and much of the currently available OTT
content promote copyright infringement, largely because relatively
few content providers and distributors have authorized access
through nontraditional media. Rather than considering alternative
distribution as a possible source of supplemental income,
incumbents initially concluded that these new options largely
promoted piracy without any upside financial opportunities.
V. NEW IPTV INTERMEDIARIES
Incumbents subsequently reconsidered the conclusion that they
should try to thwart IPTV by refusing to offer content access
alternatives. New and legal IPTV options, such as YouTube,
gained traction and visibility thereby demonstrating that even
amateur video could generate substantial audiences. Content
sources have cautiously and incrementally explored directly
distributing their content via their own branded sites or via new
intermediaries such as Amazon, Apple, Hulu, Netflix, Roku and
YouTube. 72 Most broadcast networks and many cable/satellite
networks now consider the web as offering an opportunity to reach
more viewers, thereby generating higher market penetration and
advertising revenues. These content sources typically provide
access after initial distribution via traditional media outlets so that
consumers do not abandon or regularly substitute traditional
distribution intermediaries. 73
Content distribution intermediaries can provide an interface
between video content consumers and sources. By serving as an
intermediary, these sites can enforce digital rights management 74
limitations on access, recording and redistribution as well as
collect payments for premium content or superior access options.
72

See relevant websites cited supra note 64.
E.g., HBO GO, http://www.hbogo.com (last visited Nov.9, 2013).
74
Digital Rights Management refers to the use of technological tools by copyright
owners and distributors to regulate the uses of their works, and in particular to restrict or
prohibit copying.
73
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However, content creators can only go so far in their exploration
because of existing and highly lucrative distribution contracts with
incumbent media. While it might appear enticing to eliminate
“middlemen” intermediaries, the proliferation of new ones
evidences resiliency and continuing viability of this model.
Content sources will have to calibrate closely the blend of access
options they offer directly, via incumbent outlets and via new
intermediaries.
VI. DIVERGING INCENTIVES AND INCREASED RISKS
Before the onset of new and experimental content distribution
models, content creators and distributors had established a
mutually beneficial model. This model consisted of setting up
several sequential windows of access based on the time since
initial release, and the willingness of consumers to pay for access.
Movies followed a predictable track with initial access solely in
theaters, followed by pay-per-view and other premium channel
access, followed by release of a Digital Video Disk (DVD), after
which the content becomes less a lure for direct payments from
consumers and more an advertiser supported attraction with
content typically available first on premium cable/DBS networks
and subsequently on non-premium, basic tier networks, followed
even later in time by broadcast television.
Cable programming has been tiered into categories of content
access with premium content, such as movies and high budget
original programming, located on higher cost tiers, offered as a
stand-alone premium channel, or even pay-per-view access. New
distribution models provide consumers with access to some
premium content earlier in time on an à la carte, pay-per-view
basis. Additionally some content creators have opted to provide
access to even premium content, via new access platforms operated
by incumbent distributors, or upon proof that the consumer has
already paid for a subscription, for example, to a cable television
operator.
Video program creators see new distribution platforms as
possibly offering new revenue growth opportunities and greater
market penetration. However, content creators must operate with
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caution so that they do not lose control over access to their product
and also do not harm revenue stream flowing to traditional
distribution partners. If a content creator decides to serve
consumers directly via new distribution platforms, incumbent
distributors might attempt to retaliate by favoring other content
sources.
Content distributors want to maintain the highly profitable
status quo, but the traditional locked-down, largely one-way
distribution model based on their status as unavoidable
intermediaries appears unsustainable in light of new options
available to consumers. Incumbents have reluctantly concluded
that they must provide greater access flexibility to subscribers,
including the opportunity to watch the same content multiple times
without additional payment. Incumbent video distributors so far
do not seem to think it imperative to offer vastly more content in
addition to greater flexibility in accessing existing content. With
the exception of a new cable television network managed by talk
show host Oprah Winfrey, 75 the industry has not introduced many
new networks in the last few years. Likewise, all of the top twenty
networks, in terms of number of subscribers, entered the market
years ago. 76
As new access options provide both flexibility and more
content, incumbents might recognize the need to increase options,
despite having previously assumed that they need only serve as the
gateway to designated must-see television. Consumers are
questioning in growing numbers a subscription model that
regularly increases monthly rates well above measures of overall
cost of living. Cable and DBS operators may have grown
complacent in that an AYCE model can remain dominant, because
consumers heretofore lacked options that offered the combination
of must see and niche content. Now the Internet operates as a
75

See OWN NETWORK, http://www.oprah.com/own (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
Compare Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery
of Video Programming, 15 FCC Rcd. 978 (2000) (sixth annual report detailing increase in
market of networks and providers) with In re Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, Fourteenth Report,
27 FCC Rcd. 8610 (2012) (detailing expansion of current networks into new mediums).
76
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medium for access to much of the same must-see television along
with often free access to niche content.
VII. EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS
Consumers stand to benefit from proliferating video content
access opportunities, with two caveats. First, the options cannot
subvert existing and new payment models by offering free access
to pirated content. Second, incumbents should not be able to
collude with an eye toward preventing consumers from enjoying
lawful alternative access opportunities. We can expect incumbent
cable and satellite carriers to pressure content creators not to
pursue options that eliminate them as intermediaries, whether
through direct access, or through replacement intermediaries.
Likewise, the possibility exists that incumbent intermediaries and
content sources may seek to use new digital rights management
techniques to reduce the opportunities subscribers have to copy
and share content even in lawful ways. 77 The copyright laws of
many nations provide opportunities for copying and sharing
content on a limited basis without liability for infringement.
The concept of fair use refers to the ability of consumers, under
specific and limited circumstances, to reproduce and share
copyrighted content. 78 The limits to fair use emphasize that social
benefits accrue from limited copying without significant financial
harm to the content creator. Some of the technological innovations
that make it possible to track consumers’ wants, needs and desires
also provide ways to identify and block fair use opportunities. One
such technology called deep packet inspection (“DPI”) provides a
way to identify the nature and type of content a specific subscriber
77

See Rob Frieden, Internet Packet Sniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrality
Debate and the Balance of Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and
Consumers, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 670–71 (2008).
78
See, e.g., Michael Pote, Mashed-Up In Between: The Delicate Balance Of Artists’
Interests Lost Amidst The War On Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 669–83 (2010) (fair
use enables users to reproduce copyrighted musical content under a balancing of multiple
factors to foster creativity); Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2008) (describing fair use and arguing that it plays an
important and underappreciated role in national technology and innovation policy).
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is accessing. 79 The power to track usage by subscribers can
combine with the ability to block such access immediately. 80 Fair
use typically involves copying first and defending the copying later
in court. With DPI, content creators and distributors can block
first and never have to pursue a judicial remedy. 81 This means that
even instances of fair use cannot occur because a carrier or content
creator has opted to use techniques that block suspicious activity,
regardless of whether it turns out to be an instance of fair use
instead of piracy.
End users will suffer from new content access options if
incumbents can freely condition access based on their
interpretation of what constitutes fair use. A limited view of this
user right, backed up by technologies that can block access
immediately, can further lock down content rather than provide
more diverse and lawful ways to enjoy it.
VIII.

EFFECT ON EXISTING MEDIA-SPECIFIC LEGAL AND
REGULATORY MODELS
Technological and marketplace convergences make it possible
for the Internet to become the single, preferred medium for the
delivery of information, communications and entertainment
(“ICE”) services to consumers. Both incumbent and market
entrants have the opportunity to accrue economies of scale and
scope and to increase their size, revenue and profitability by using
the Internet cloud as a medium for delivering content to television
sets, computer monitors, tablets and smartphone screens.
Technological and marketplace convergences have become a
reality with the Internet increasingly becoming the single preferred
medium for delivery of previously separate broadcast, cable,
satellite and telecommunication services. Subscribers of a wired or
wireless ISP can use their broadband link to the Internet cloud for
79

See Peter Whoriskey, Every Click You Make, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR2008040304052.html.
80
See id.
81
See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair
Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60–68 (2006).
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access to a plethora of content previously available only via
broadcast, cable or satellite media.
Both the FCC 82 and reviewing courts 83 have evidenced a
reluctance to deviate from applying medium-specific, single
regulatory classifications even for services that display convergent
characteristics. 84 For example, the FCC has determined that all
forms of broadband Internet access constitutes a substantially
unregulated information service, 85 despite the fact that
82

The FCC appears to believe that it must apply only one regulatory classification to a
service that may combine two or more functions. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R 11501, 11522 (1998) (report to
Congress) (“[T]he language and legislative history of [the Communications Act of 1996]
indicate that the drafters . . . regarded telecommunications services and information
services as mutually exclusive categories.”); see also Vonage Holdings Corp., 290 F.
Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (D. Minn. 2003) (applying the FCC’s dichotomy). Perceiving the
need to apply one classification the FCC appears to favor using the less restrictive one.
For example, the Commission treats all types of broadband access as information
services. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities,17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling and notice
of proposed rulemaking) (asserting that cable modem service is appropriately classified
as an internet service and not a cable service), aff’d Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 977–86 (2005) (affirming the classification that
does not subject cable modem service to Title II common-carrier regulation).
83
Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state law
mandating right of reply to editorial deemed to violate newspaper publisher’s First
Amendment speaker rights) with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
(upholding FCC-mandated right of reply to broadcast personal attack in light of
comparatively greater listeners’ First Amendment rights over that available to
broadcasters).
84
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently evidenced an
appreciation that a single carrier can offer two or more services triggering different
regulatory classifications. In Cellco Partnership, the court affirmed the FCC’s
requirement that wireless carriers must provide “data roaming” Internet access to
temporary visitors. Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To achieve
such access the FCC required all carriers to negotiate commercial interconnection
agreements if technologically feasible, despite the fact that the FCC had classified
Internet access as an information service not subject to Title II common carrier
regulation. Id. at 535. The court expressed appreciation that some services combine
features and characteristics: “[C]ommon carriage is not all or nothing—there is a grey
area in which although a given regulation might be applied to common carriers, the
obligations imposed are not common carriage per se.” Id. at 547.
85
Information service is defined as:
[T]he offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
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telecommunications networks provide the transmission needed to
link subscribers in many geographical locations with content and
services located elsewhere. 86
ISPs qualify for largely unregulated status based mainly on the
view that government has no legal basis for regulating the content
traversing the various networks that make up the Internet.
Additionally, Congress and the FCC assume ISPs operate in a
robustly competitive marketplace, or alternatively that these
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for
the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications
system or the management of a telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2010).
86
The FCC treats information services and telecommunications services as mutually
exclusive. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress,
13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11522 (1998) (“[T]he language and legislative history of [the
Communications Act of 1996] indicate that the drafters . . . regarded telecommunications
services and information services as mutually exclusive categories.”); see also Vonage
Holdings Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 994, 1000 (following the guidelines of the Stevens
Report). This self-imposed constraint has forced the FCC to apply a single regulatory
classification to services that combine telecommunications and information services. In
solely applying the information services classification to broadband, the FCC opted to
ignore or subordinate the telecommunications function. See Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14910–
11 (2005) (report and order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (“We conclude,
consistent with Brand X, that such a transmission component [in a DSL service] is mere
‘telecommunications’ and not a ‘telecommunications service.’ As stated above, the Act
defines telecommunications service as ‘the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to
the public, regardless of the facilities used.’ Thus, whether a telecommunications service
is being provided turns on what the entity is ‘offering . . . to the public,’ and customers’
understanding of that service. End users subscribing to wireline broadband Internet
access service expect to receive (and pay for) a finished, functionally integrated service
that provides access to the Internet. End users do not expect to receive (or pay for) two
distinct services—both Internet access service and a distinct transmission service, for
example. Thus, the transmission capability is part and parcel of, and integral to, the
Internet access service capabilities. Accordingly, we conclude that wireline broadband
Internet access service does not include the provision of a telecommunications service to
the end user irrespective of how the service provider may decide to offer the transmission
component to other service providers.”); see also Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery
and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From Recent Judicial and
Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247
(2006).
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ventures do not provide essential public utility service
necessitating heavy-handed regulatory oversight to ensure fair and
nondiscriminatory access to these services at reasonable prices.
Under either scenario, the FCC must have assumed that it would
not need to resolve interconnection disputes between Internetventures, or to remedy anticompetitive practices of an ISP. The
FCC’s confidence in a self-regulating Internet has proven
unjustified, because the Commission has received complaints
about predatory and discriminatory practices for which it lacks a
direct statutory basis to remedy. 87 Having deemed the Internet as
worthy of deregulation as an information service, the FCC cannot
subsequently re-regulate it, absent judicial deference or new
legislation.
Courts have allowed the Commission to regulate VoIP
telephone service alternatives, 88 but not to sanction Comcast for
what appeared to be an anticompetitive practice. 89 In the former,
the FCC successfully invoked the need to maintain regulatory
parity between legacy telephone service and VoIP, without even
having to specify that VoIP constitutes a telecommunications
87

See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, 13028
(2008) (memorandum opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (the FCC determined that Comcast deliberately thwarted file sharing
from and to subscribers with an eye toward creating disincentives for broadband
subscribers to use alternatives to the company’s pay per view, video on demand services).
88
See Vonage Holding Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming
FCC regulatory oversight of VoIP and preempting state deregulation or inconsistent
regulation and FCC’s decision to require VoIP operators to contribute to universal service
funds); Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 303 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring
interconnected VoIP service providers to supply 911 emergency calling capabilities); The
Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to
Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and Broadband Internet
Service Providers, 27 FCC Rcd. 2650, 2655 (2012) (report and order) (requiring VoIP
carriers to report service outages); Local Number Portability Porting Interval and
Validation Requirements, 25 FCC Rcd. 6953, 6966–68 (2010) (report and order)
(establishing fast deadlines for migrating a telephone service subscriber to and from VoIP
service); Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 22 FCC Rcd. 6927,
6929 (2007) (report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending
customer proprietary network information obligations to interconnected VoIP service
providers).
89
See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661.
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service. 90 In the latter, the FCC abandoned direct statutory
authority to regulate Internet-based services by determining that all
broadband services qualify for a “safe harbor” from regulation as
information services. 91
Convergence and the ascendency of the Internet make it certain
that a single venture will offer both regulated telecommunications
services and largely unregulated information services, possibly
combined into a hybrid or composite. For example, wireless
carriers provide subscribers with the option of using their handsets
for basic voice telephone service, a telecommunications service,
but also to access the Internet, an information service. Many
subscribers quickly and frequently toggle between both services,
yet the FCC has made no effort to respond to this reality. The
Commission continues to treat voice and data services as separate,
despite the fact that the same carrier provides both.
The FCC and courts should explicitly recognize that single
ventures could provide an array of different services that trigger
different regulatory classifications and First Amendment
protection. Failing to do so means that a venture can try to invoke
a single classification that accrues the best regulatory and
marketplace posture, with the option of changing that election at
any time. For example, an ISP can claim to operate as a First
Amendment speaker, entitled to robust insulation from government
intrusion, but then change its posture to neutral conduit if doing so
qualifies it for even better entitlements, for example, safe harbor
exemption from liability for subscribers’ copyright infringement,
or other harmful activities including defamation. 92

90

See Vonage Holding Corp., 489 F.3d at 1240–41.
See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028,
13034–36 (2008).
92
See Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1279, 1279 (2010).
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ideally Congress should amend the Communications Act of
1934 to establish the conditions under which the FCC would have
jurisdiction to resolve complaints and to remedy anticompetitive
practices.
Convergent services using the Internet do not
sufficiently track any of the existing broadcasting,
telecommunications and video services. Accordingly a new Title
for Internet Services should specify that the FCC has statutory
authority to intervene when commercial negotiations cannot
resolve interconnection and other disputes among ventures and
when competition proves unsustainable to prevent anticompetitive
practices.
This Title should reverse the FCC’s conclusion that any and all
Internet services constitute information services by explicitly
acknowledging that limited regulatory safeguards are necessary.
Specifically, the Title should ensure that carriers providing the
telecommunications link between end users and the sources of
content and software are subject to FCC oversight to ensure that
their commercially negotiated interconnection terms and
conditions for service are transparent and nondiscriminatory. This
Title should not mandate common carriage, but put private carriers
on notice that they cannot impose non-neutral rules and access
conditions that have the effect of retarding competition and robust
access.
The new Internet Services Title should explicitly state that the
limited regulatory safeguards created do not extend to ventures that
acquire or lease transmission capacity on top of which they add
services, applications and software. This Title should provide no
basis for regulating content, or the protocols and operating
standards Internet ventures use to manage their networks.
Likewise the Title should mandate network neutrality only to the
extent needed to prevent ISPs from deliberately throttling, delaying
or blocking traffic that causes no harm even as it might compete
with services provided by the ISP or an affiliate. The vast majority
of instances where the FCC should intervene should result from a
complaint about the terms and conditions under which two or more
ISPs interconnect lines and facilities.
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The FCC should have lawful statutory authority to remedy
disputes among carriers and between carriers and subscribers when
the parties cannot reach a timely settlement. 93 This authority
covers both telecommunications services and information services.
However, the Commission must act with restraint in light of
limited statutory authority to act prospectively instead of
responding to a complaint. The possibility exists that many, if not
most disputes can get resolved through commercial negotiations.
On the other hand, intractable disputes may increase, particularly
ones where stalling favors one side. For these types of problems,
the FCC should have lawful authority to investigate and remedy
anticompetitive and discriminatory practices.

93

Sometimes FCC inaction will result in temporary inconvenience to consumers, for
example, when desirable television channels are eliminated in retransmission consent
negotiations between broadcasters and cable television operators. See Meg Burton,
Reforming Retransmission Consent, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 617, 618–19 (2012). However
premature regulatory intervention might cause greater harm.

